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Abstract  
This article explores the nature of inter-Asian trade dynamics through a consideration of the role 
played by traders from northern Afghanistan’s Central Asian borderlands. It explores the role that 
traders from this region have played in commercial exchanges involving China, the Arabian Peninsula 
and a range of settings in West Asia. In addition to documenting the inter-Asian scope of these 
traders’ activities, the article also addresses the shifting nature of their identity formations in 
relationship to successive waves of migration. The traders often identify themselves in relationship 
to ethno-national identity categories (Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik) that are politically salient in Central 
Asia and Afghanistan today. At the same time, the traders also emphasise their being from families 
that migrated from the territories of the Emirate of Bukhara during the early years of communist 
rule in the 1920s and 1930s. In the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, many of 
these families moved from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, often staying for several years in cities and 
towns in Pakistan. Over the past three decades, Central Asian émigré families have increasingly 
established their businesses and communities in the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey; they also run 
offices in the trading cities of maritime China. 
Keywords  
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Introduction 
This article focuses on the role played by traders from northern Afghanistan’s Central Asian 
borderlands in facilitating commercial exchanges between China, the Arabian Peninsula and a range 
of settings in West Asia. It explores in particular the activities across these contexts of traders who 
both identify themselves in relationship to a range of ethnic categories salient in Afghanistan and 
Central Asia today – especially Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik – as well as the descendants of families 
from Bukhara (az Bukhara) who emigrated from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan in the 1920s and 
1930s. In the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, these families moved from Afghanistan 
to Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, often staying for several years in cities and towns in Pakistan. 
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Over the past three decades, such Central Asian émigré families (who mostly hold Afghan, Pakistani 
and increasingly Turkish nationality/travel documents) have established themselves as significant 
actors in the import to the Arabian Peninsula of commodities made in China.1  
The article builds on and seeks to contribute towards two bodies of literature that cross the 
boundaries of history and anthropology and fall within the study of ‘Inter-Asian’ connections and 
circulations. An expanding body of work has sought to shed light on the dynamic relations between 
adjacent parts of Asia through a focused consideration of changes and continuities in the movement 
of people, ideas, and things, as well as the ‘nodes’, ‘way-stations’ and ‘choke points’ that such forms 
of movement also produce and require (e.g. Ho 2006; Tagliacozzo 2013). This scholarship has 
brought recognition to the significance of connections between geographical Asian settings that had 
previously been obscured because of the ‘sub-regional’ frame of analysis (e.g. Amrith 2013). This 
body of work has focused on the role played by newer and older types of networks in facilitating 
transregional connections and circulations across adjacent contexts. While such contexts had been 
historically connected to one another, they came to be thought of as belonging to distinct world 
regions as a result of the development of area studies in the Cold War context (e.g. Henig 2016; 
Kotkin 2007). Scholarship in this vein has done a great deal to challenge the notion that the nation-
state and the sub-region are always the most relevant geographical scales of analysis.  
A second body of literature that I have found helpful in the analysis of the ethnographic material 
presented in this article concerns the complex nature of Muslim networks that criss-crossed the 
borders of the Ottoman, British and Russian Empire at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. This 
literature has complicated the assumption earlier that such connections inevitably constituted a step 
towards the emergence of international identity formation, such as Pan-Turkism, Pan Turanism, or 
Pan-Asian thinking (e.g. Brophy 2016; Meyer 2014; Reynolds 2009). Instead, scholarship 
demonstrates how the individuals involved in such forms of border-crossing mobility were as much 
concerned with the pragmatic concerns of trade and political stability as they were with ideologies 
or identity projects. There is also growing recognition of the ways in which such networks were 
viewed from the perspective of empires and government officials. While Russian imperial officials 
did see long-distance networks made-up of Muslims as a potential source of subversive religious 
thought and action, they also recognised the ways in which such networks could be harnessed to 
further the stretch imperial power beyond territorial borders (Kane 2005). Networks were indeed 
exploited as a source of revenue and of modern trading practices, not least because Russian 
merchants were regarded as being less adaptable and capable of risk-taking trade than Muslim 
merchants in this period (Monahan 2015).  
This article seeks to make a contribution to these parallel developments in the field of inter-Asian 
studies in two ways. It aims, firstly, to analytically extend the understanding of Inter-Asian dynamics 
by exploring not merely transregional connections forged by networks operating across adjacent 
regions, but, additionally, the connective role being played by ‘mobile societies’ from one Asian sub-
region (Central Asia) in two further Asian settings (West and East Asia). The study of inter-Asian 
dynamics brings to light connections between regions. But it also requires scholars to disassemble 
assumed relationships between different Asian contexts, and to reassemble these from the point-of-
view of the actors under study. This process of reassembling requires a rethinking of the role played 
by polities in such processes : something widely demonstrated by the ubiquitous use of the term 
                                                          
1 I use the term émigré in this article in convention with other literature on Afghanistan’s Central Asians (e.g. 
Shahrani 2001) because of the recognition it gives to the multifaceted aspects of their various stages of 
movement and dispersals in a manner that more one-dimensional terms used in migration studies (such as 
emigrant and refugee) do not afford.  
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‘transnationalism’ in the analysis of long-distance networks, and the rise of scholarship contesting 
‘methodological nationalism’. As Engseng Ho has recently argued, however, a fuller understanding of 
transregional dynamics also requires a model of society that can embrace the type of ‘small, mobile, 
and less integrated’ social formations that have largely not been encompassed by the study of the 
social science-based study of large scale social aggregates (Ho 2017). In what follows, I respond to 
Engseng Ho’s call for ‘thick transregionalism’ – ‘a spatially expansive, integrative account of a mobile 
society’ - by presenting an account of multiple ‘partial communities’ that are connected to each 
other in the context of an Asia-wide arena of circulation and interaction (Ho 2017; cf. Ho 2014).  
The second contribution of this article relates to my interest in the activities of Central Asian inland 
merchants in the maritime nodes of Arabia (Jeddah) and the Mediterranean (Istanbul). An analysis of 
this brings to light a specific type of node that is of particular value for anthropologists and historians 
concerned by the Inter-Asian dynamics. There has been a tendency in much of existing literature in 
anthropology on Inter-Asian dynamics to focus on one of multiple geographical axes of inter-Asian 
interaction (e.g. Eurasian/Indian Ocean/West-East Asia dynamics). Yet the traders who are the focus 
of this article bring sharply into focus nodes such as Yiwu, Jeddah, Istanbul at which different axes of 
Inter-Asian interaction collide. Such nodes offer a privileged site for tracking shifts in the identity 
formations of established trading networks, the ways in which such shifts relate to the strategies of 
states in relationship to such mobile societies, and the transforming circumstances of the traders 
themselves.  
Afghan Traders in Yiwu 
I first became aware of the significance of Yiwu as a node for the activity of Afghan merchants in 
relationship to research I conducted into the commercial activities of Afghanistan in the former 
Soviet Union, especially Russia and Ukraine (Marsden 2016a, 2016b). During research in Yiwu in 
2016, however, I came to recognise that Yiwu was a significant node not merely for traders involved 
in the sale of Chinese-made ‘small commodities’ (especially toys, hardware items, and souvenirs) in 
the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan, but also across a range of world regions. During many 
evenings spent chatting with the traders in restaurants, cafes and shisha parlours, I was introduced 
to merchants purchasing commodities in Yiwu who were visiting the city from Pakistan, Iran, 
Malaysia, the UAE, the USA and Canada, and Western Europe.  
I also met several traders from Afghanistan in Yiwu who told me of their businesses in Saudi Arabia – 
a country in which the port city of Jeddah was described as being a base both for Afghan merchants 
and community life more generally. One of the restaurants I visited most frequently was owned by 
traders from northern Afghanistan who had lived intermittently in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE since having left Afghanistan in 1983. The owner of the establishment had recently moved his 
family to India, where he said the cost of life was cheaper and the standard of education higher than 
in the UAE. Furthermore, many of the merchants who gathered in this restaurant to eat, drink green 
tea, and chat while relaxing in the Afghan-style carpeted floor seating area told me that either they 
or their families owned homes in Turkey, most especially Istanbul.  
The majority of these traders identify themselves as being ethnically Turkmen, and as having been 
born in Afghanistan’s northern provinces, especially Balkh, Kunduz and Jowzjan. Turkmen-speakers 
constitute a very small minority in modern day Afghanistan, and these provinces are, indeed, 
ethnically mixed regions that are home to populations of Farsi and Uzbek -speaking Muslims, as well 
as to substantial communities of Pashtuns, most of which were relocated to northern Afghanistan by 
Pashtun state officials at the turn of the twentieth century (e.g. Tapper 1978; cf. Fuori 2017). Thus, 
while traders who identify themselves as being Turkmen are most visible in the trade between China 
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and Saudi Arabia, Uzbek and Farsi-speaking merchants also play a critical role in such activities. 
There is also frequent interaction across the social and economic spheres between traders who 
identify with these distinct identity registers. Several traders informed me that they are from ‘mixed’ 
backgrounds, being descended from a Farsi-speaking ‘Tajik’ mother and Uzbek-speaking father, for 
instance.   
The activities of northern Afghan traders active in Saudi are widely known by Yiwu-based Afghans 
who work in different world regions. Indeed, from the perspective of Afghan traders based in Yiwu, 
their compatriots who run businesses in Jeddah are said to be some of the wealthiest Afghans 
abroad and involved in the most stable and high scale trading activities: ‘a small business in Jeddah’, 
I was often told in Yiwu, ‘means at least 10 containers of goods transported between China and 
Saudi per month’. Traders of Afghan background are major exporters of clothing and machine-made 
carpets from China to Saudi Arabia. The sale of these commodities in Saudi Arabia is connected to 
the annual hajj pilgrimage, during which Muslim pilgrims from across the world purchase these 
items as gifts to take home to their relatives and friends (Erin 2007). Given the importance of 
northern Afghanistan for the worldwide trade in carpets (Spooner 1986), traders have a long history 
of being involved in the supply of prayer mats and carpets more generally both to hajj pilgrims and 
to the markets of the Gulf. During fieldwork in Jeddah I was told how until the 1970s hajjis coming 
from Afghanistan to the Holy Cities would bring hand-knotted carpets with them in the overland 
convoys (carawan) in which they travelled, and sell these in Jeddah, Mecca, and Madina, both to 
pilgrims and also buyers from Yemen. By the 1990s much of this trade appears to have shifted 
toward the import of machine-made carpets from Turkey, especially the eastern city of Gaziantep, a 
commercial activity in which traders from northern Afghanistan based in both Jeddah and Istanbul 
played an active role. In the last decade, an increasing proportion of the prayer mats are imported 
from China. 
Bukhara: from Trading node to Regional periphery 
The traders whose activities are documented below largely identify their homes in Afghanistan as 
being in the country’s north-west and north east. Today, these Afghan provinces all lie on the border 
with the former Soviet Republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Until the consolidation 
of the Afghan state this region was made-up of various dynasties involved in tributary relationships 
both with the Emirate of Bukhara as well as well with polities to the east and the south (Lee 1996). 
After the delineation of an international boundary by the Afghan Boundary Commission in the mid-
nineteenth century (Fuori 2017), the region formed Afghan Turkestan, which shared a border with 
the Emirate of Bukhara/Russian Turkistan. Most of the traders described below are from families 
that moved permanently to Afghan Turkestan in the late 1920s in the wake of Stalinist purges of 
notables, wealthy peasants, and religious authorities in Central Asia (Khalid 2014). This period also 
saw the progressive rigidification of the border between Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan (e.g. 
Marsden and Hopkins 2012). Many of my informants inform me that their families had been 
merchants and craftsmen ever since moving to Afghanistan. Some of the families appear to have 
turned to trading after leaving their home villages and towns in Central Asia; others talk about their 
families as having been merchants before leaving Central Asia (Jalallar 2011).  
Bukhara was a historic site of transregional Asian trade that involved merchants from the region 
travelling to Iran, Muscovy, Siberia, China and India. Audrey Burton (1993) documented the wide 
range of contexts that were important to the activities of Bukharan merchants between 1558 and 
1718. Merchants from Bukhara made trading sorties across this period to Iran, Muscovy, Siberia, 
China and India. On the course of these sorties they both transported goods from Bukhara for sale 
(especially the region’s high-quality cotton materials, and furs largely made from sheepskin), and 
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purchased goods for sale either in Bukhara or another region in which Bukharan merchants were 
active: rhubarb purchased in China and Siberia was thus sold in Iran, where it was regarded as an 
essential medicinal ingredient.2 Officials frequently imposed barriers on the ability of Bukharan 
merchants to operate across these contexts. In the wake of the Turkish invasion of Vienna, 
Muscovy’s Tsars imposed restrictions on the movement of Bukharan Muslim merchants. Not all 
Bukharan merchants operated in this mobile manner. Burton also identifies the role played by 
individual merchants who were permanently settled outside of the Emirate to the activities of 
merchants based in the Emirate. In Siberia, for example, settled Bukhara merchants both owned 
land and ran businesses (see Monahan 2015). In addition to dealing with far away people and their 
rulers, Bukhara’s merchants also engaged in close trading relations with the communities 
surrounding the urban centres in which they were based: they collected fur and carpets from 
Turkmen tribes and provided Bukhara’s elite with fermented mare’s milk.3  
Over the nineteenth century the Emirate of Bukhara was gradually incorporated into the Russian 
Empire and in later years the Soviet Union: this led to the demise of the city’s historic status as an 
urban commercial centre (Humphrey et al. 2009). In the wake of the establishment of the Soviet 
Union, however, a proportion of Bukhara’s commercial community left Central Asia, moving into 
present-day Iran, Afghanistan, Chinese Turkestan, and India (e.g. Nasiri and Khalili 2013). Having left 
Central Asia, some of the Central Asian émigré s settled in the contexts to which they had initially 
moved: northern Afghanistan continues to be home to substantial communities of Central Asian 
émigré (Shahrani 2001). Other émigré families, however, migrated out of these neighbouring 
regions, most frequently to the holy cities of the Hejaz, Mecca and Madinah. In the Hejaz, there 
were pre-existent communities of Central Asians who had initially travelled to Arabia with the 
intention of making the hajj pilgrimage, but later stayed on either because they lacked the funds to 
return home or sought to benefit from the opportunities offered by acting as middleman between 
Arab guides and Central Asian pilgrims.4 In later years, these communities were joined by  émigrés 
from Chinese Turkestan fled who either fled after the collapse of the Turkistan state in 1949 or 
found themselves conducting pilgrimage in Arabia as the events in China unfolded.  
Bukharan émigré s who remained in northern Afghanistan adapted to a new set of circumstances in 
Afghan Turkestan.5 After moving to Afghanistan, the trade of lamb pelt (karakul) continued to be of 
importance to members of the community, which also became active in related commercial fields, 
such as the sale of meat and skins.6 Northern Afghanistan’s fur trade had also attracted Farsi-
speaking Afghan Jewish traders and financiers based in the cities of Kabul and Herat, as well as 
Ashkenazi and Bukharan Jews who had fled the violence that affected their lives and commercial 
                                                          
2 Such forms of commercial activity were also of critical importance to the development of other of Central 
Asia’s polities: see Levi (2017) for a discussion of the role played by Xinjiang merchants in the fortunes of 
Khoqand. 
3 Turkmen tribes traded slaves in Russia and Central Asia (e.g. Eden 2016), though his is not an aspect of their 
commercial pasts which has been broached with me. 
4 Kane (2016) refers to a Russian official who visited the Hejaz in 1895 referring to a ‘tight-knit Turkestani 
émigré community living and working in Jeddah, Mecca and Medina’ (Kane 2016: 79).  
5 According to Spooner (1986: 216) the production of ‘Bukharan’ carpets for Western markets ‘ceased’ 
between 1930 and the 1960s.The fate of the fur trade during these years is unclear.  
6 These families themselves make distinctions between Turkmen families who moved to Afghanistan after the 
1920s, and those who have been based in the country since before the migrations of the early twentieth 
century. In the context of Afghanistan’s contemporary politics, in which ethnicised debates about which 
communities might refer to themselves as ‘truly’ Afghan, the making of such distinctions is invested with 
considerable political potency (Shahrani 2001; Shalinsky 1994).  
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activities in Baku, Bukhara, Samarqand, and Tashkent from 1918 onwards.7 Afghan government 
officials argued that Bolshevik agents were working in Afghanistan under the guise of being Jewish 
traders, resulting in the expulsion of Jewish Central Asian émigrés  from Afghanistan, and, 
eventually, the departure of a significant proportion of the country’s sizeable Jewish community to 
Palestine (Koplik 2013). Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that traders today intermittently 
suggest that some members of their community are ‘originally’ (asli) Bukharan Jews who converted 
to Islam only after having moved to Afghanistan from the Soviet Union.   
The modern trade in ‘Bukharan’ carpets to European and American markets stretches to the 
eighteenth century (Spooner 1986). From 1960s to the present day some of Afghanistan’s most well-
known merchants came from families that had crossed the Amu Darya and migrated to Afghanistan 
in the late 1920s and 1930s. Such merchants were especially respected for the role they played in 
innovating the production and distribution of carpets, most especially by ‘establishing small factories 
in northern Afghanistan that employed men and children to weave cheap carpets specifically for the 
Western market’ (Spooner 1986: 216-17), opening transport companies that connected the cities of 
northern Afghanistan to Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Germany, as well as for creating international 
business networks, most especially in the centres of the carpet trade, Hamburg and Istanbul.  
The case of Agha Qilich and his family is a good example of a ‘mobile family’ that operates across 
different political regimes and negotiates both multiple historical ruptures and more gradual 
transformations. A brief consideration of Qilich Agha’s life history highlights the ways in which 
individual merchant have been as much concerned with the pragmatic concerns of trade in an 
overall context of political flux as with adherence to specific identity projects. Qilich Agha is 
renowned by merchants across Afghanistan and its diasporas for having created an international 
distribution market for Turkmen carpets made in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Qilich Agha opened 
warehouses in Istanbul and later Hamburg (a historic centre for the carpet trade in Western Europe); 
he also financed the construction of a market complex in Kabul, the Qilich Agha market: this market 
now houses the wholesale shops and offices of carpet dealers from across northern Afghanistan. In 
addition to being a significant player in the carpet industry and trade, Qilich is also said to be been 
successful in his trading operations in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan was created in 1924 as a 
constituent Republic of the Soviet Union in 1924, before becoming an independent Republic after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.8 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Qilich Agha 
exported petrol and oil from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, navigating the country’s complex political 
dynamics and mediating between its government and the Taliban government who controlled much 
after Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. Qilich Agha is said to have made some less profitable 
investments during this period in Turkey, seeking to open carpet producing factories in the town of 
Tokat – a town in the mid-Black Sea region of Anatolia to which dozens of Turkmen families were 
resettled by the Turkish government in the 1980s. He is often said to have passed his final years 
consigned to a care home in Germany, while his offspring failed to demonstrate the commercial 
acumen of their father.   
Oil, Wheat, and Chinese-made Vodka Bottles: Afghan Turkmen traders in Central Asia 
Understanding the growing significance of ethnically Turkmen traders to Afghanistan’s international 
trading connections after the 1980s requires a brief consideration of their activities in Central Asia 
before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. After 1991, thousands of Afghans who 
identified themselves as being Turkmen, moved to Turkmenistan in order to escape civil war in 
                                                          
7 On Afghanistan’s Jewish communities, see Koplik 2003.  
8 See Edgar 2004. 
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Afghanistan. For those who had served in the pro-Soviet government, and had connections through 
politics and education to the governments of countries in the former Soviet Union there were also 
clear opportunities for trade (Marsden 2016b). In the case of Turkmenistan, these opportunities 
arose in relationship to the export of Turkmen oil – a source of international interest at the time, 
hence the visit by Taliban officials and American oil dealers to the country in the mid-1990s. Afghan 
Turkmens were significant to the Turkmen government because of their ability to organise the 
transport of the commodity to Afghanistan, as well as its sale. Indeed, during these years the 
Turkmen government itself supported attempts to fashion a global Turkmen diasporic identity and 
through this loyalty to the newly independent Turkmen state. It organised for example an annual 
World Turkmen Congress meeting to which individuals identified as ethnically Turkmen and resident 
in various countries within and beyond Asia were invited. By the mid-2000s the Turkmenistan state 
appeared however to have adopted more restrictive policy on the activities of Turkmen-identifying 
Afghans within its boundaries. During the mid-2000s, most of the established Turkmen traders of 
Afghan citizenship who were based in Turkmenistan were deported from the country to Afghanistan. 
Deportations were often framed by the government of Turkmenistan as accusations of involvement 
in narcotic smuggling. The Turkmen state also expelled Afghan Turkmens who had cooperated with 
its intelligence agency in the surveillance of Afghan traders formerly based in the country.  
The restriction of access to Turkmenistan by traders from Afghanistan came at a historical juncture 
during which new commercial opportunities were opening in Afghanistan, largely as a result of the 
post 2001 September 11th intervention by the USA and its NATO allies. Traders previously based in 
Turkmenistan were in a unique position to supply NATO forces with precious resources, such as 
petrol and aeroplane fuel. Others used their contacts with government officials, customs offices, 
intelligence agents, merchants, and bazaar-owners in Turkmenistan and Central Asia more generally 
to facilitate the transportation of NATO goods along the so-called Northern Supply Lines. These 
routes involved the transportation of goods from the Baltic port of Riga, through the Russian 
Federation, and then along a series of routes through the Muslim-majority states of Central Asia 
(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan). The ability of transporters to 
move goods through these locales quickly and sustaining limited loses to thieves and corrupt officials 
en route were highly valued by the international logistic companies contracted by NATO.  At the 
time of the withdrawal of the bulk of NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan in 2014, these 
transporters once again facilitated the international organisation by assisting in the transport of their 
hardware out of the country. In addition to engaging in such logistical activities, some traders who 
had made money in Turkmenistan in the 1990s opened banks in Afghanistan; many others took the 
capital they had earned in Turkmenistan out of Afghanistan and to the UAE. 
As is the case with many other present-day Asian trading networks in the contemporary era (e.g. 
Ho2017; Stephan-Emmrich 2017), the importance of the UAE to the internationalisation of the 
activities of Afghanistan’s Central Asian émigré families cannot be underestimated.  Furthermore, 
even outside of Central Asia, the traders recognised that it was pragmatically expedient to 
emphasise ethnic identities that reflected the political dynamics of post-Soviet Central Asia. The 
nature of Afghan Turkmen trading practices in the city are noteworthy in that they combined the 
traditional role of commission agent/transporter with that of service provider/mehmon saray 
(guesthouse) manager for visiting merchants from the post-Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan. From 
the mid-2000s onwards, ethnically Turkmen traders from Afghanistan opened offices in the Emirate 
of Sharjah that facilitated the trading visits of customers from Turkmenistan. According to most 
Turkmens of Afghan citizenship, Turkmens from Turkmenistan are not naturally gifted traders, 
thanks to the influence of years of Soviet rule, and so therefore need the assistance of expert traders 
during their purchasing trips to the UAE. Afghan Turkmens could play this role naturally because 
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both of their ability to communicate in Turkmen, and their expertise in the field of trade. Thus, the 
Afghan Turkmens established a ‘system’: Turkmenistan visitors were received at airports in the UAE, 
before being taken to the trading offices or mehrmon saray (guesthouses) of the Afghan Turkmens 
(mostly in Sharjah where housing is cheaper than neighbouring Dubai), where they were fed and 
accommodated. The Afghan Turkmens also provided their professional services as purchasers of 
commodities, as well as the transporters of these goods to Turkmenistan (mostly overland using the 
Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border posts of Turghundi and/or 
Aqinah). From the way in which the Afghan Turkmen traders describe the system it was both 
comprehensive (the visitors from Turkmenistan placed themselves in the hands of their hosts from 
arrival to departure) and also profitable. Profits were so good indeed that Turkmen Afghan families 
based in Pakistan (mostly in the cities of Lahore and Peshawar where they were involved in the 
manufacture and trade of Turkmen carpets) decided to move to the UAE during this period to open 
‘trading offices’. 
The UAE’s status as a sustainable site of trade for these families was relatively short-lived. This type 
of trading activity faced a major setback in or around 2012 when the government of Turkmenistan 
imposed new duties on imported vehicles, the commodity that most people from the country had 
travelled to the UAE in order to purchase. As a result, the trading activities of Turkmen in Dubai 
quickly dried up. In the face of these changes several traders moved their operations from the UAE 
to Yiwu. In Yiwu they opened transport companies that once again sought to attract custom from 
their co-ethnics from across the border in Turkmenistan. In the face of rising costs in Dubai and the 
easy access in Yiwu to ‘commodities of daily use’ (souvenirs, gifts, kitchenware, electrical items, 
hardware, bags and suitcases, etc.), more traders and shopkeepers from Turkmenistan had started 
to travel to the city to purchase goods from 2010 onwards (according to a senior Yiwu municipal 
government official with whom I have spoken there was an unexpected surge in the trade between 
Yiwu and Turkmenistan in 2016).  
There are Turkmen citizens who run transport agencies in Yiwu. Yet during fieldwork I saw how 
traders from the country regularly employ Afghan Turkmen during their business activities in the 
city.  Why do traders from Turkmenistan use the ‘services’ of Afghan Turkmens in China as they had 
done preciously in Dubai? It was now in the interest of visiting traders from Turkmenistan to work 
with Afghan Turkmens for two reasons. Firstly, traders from Turkmenistan are frequently said to 
‘encounter problems’ from their government and its security agencies if they are out of the country 
for substantial periods of time, thus making it difficult for Turkmenistan nationals to establish 
shipping companies in China. Secondly, building partnerships with émigré Turkmens from 
Afghanistan resolved some of the issues that traders from Turkmenistan faced in terms of 
international cash transfers. In 2016, in the face of growing financial insecurity caused by 
international sanctions on the Russia Federation and the falling price of oil globally, the 
Turkmenistan government enforced strict controls on currency exchange, especially the movement 
of US dollars out of the country. In the face of these controls, suppliers in China, as well as 
transporters and trading companies, complained in the spring of 2016 that the bills of their 
Turkmenistan customers went unpaid for months. In northern Afghanistan in October 2016, I met 
émigré Turkmen traders (based in Afghanistan) who were seeking to send relatives to Ashgabat 
(Turkmenistan’s capital) to open ‘trading offices’. One of the traders’ brother was working for a 
company in Yiwu: the companies sent commodities on credit to Turkmenistan from China (my friend 
had recently exported a container load of glass bottles for vodka) yet rather than being paid in 
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dollars, oil would be exported to Afghanistan from Turkmenistan.9 The importance of barter for 
trading relations during the early post-Soviet period is widely documented (e.g. Seabright 2000). Its 
significance to the economies of countries such as Turkmenistan today suggest that far from being a 
trading modus operandi that is turned to in hard times, barter is a durable element of the region’s 
economies as well as of its people’s modes of maintaining cross-border relations and inter-Asian 
connections (cf. Humphrey and Hugh Jones 1992). 
Supplying the Hajjis - Northern Afghan Merchants in Saudi Arabia and Turkey 
Many of the traders explored above remained in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s, and, indeed, 
were aligned to the pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA): the positions they 
occupied in the PDPA and the Afghan state in the 1980s afforded them access to networks and 
actors critical for their commercial activities in Turkmenistan during the 1990s and early 2000s. By 
contrast, many of the traders explored in what follows left Afghanistan in the early 1980s and 
assiduously cultivate themselves as being merchants with no interest in Afghanistan’s politics or 
indeed in the commercial opportunities it offers. Most of these families left Afghanistan having been 
labelled ‘feudal’ by the communist government and told that their property would be confiscated. 
Many also simultaneously feared that anti-government mujahidin groups would compel their male 
children to fight against the invading Red Army. These traders initially moved from Afghanistan to 
Pakistan: hundreds of families established homes in cities (notably Peshawar and Lahore), eventually 
establishing workshops in which carpets with Turkmen designs were produced, and then sold to 
Pakistani, Afghan, and international carpet dealers. Other families - shortly after their arrival in 
Pakistan in the 1980s - procured Pakistani travel documents that allowed them to travel to Saudi 
Arabia on working visas. For all such people, the lengthy process of obtaining residency in Saudi 
Arabia was expensive, complex and drawn out – most Central Asian émigré s in the 1980s who 
travelled to Saudi Arabia used the documents that they had acquired in Pakistan to obtain residency. 
In later years this posed major problems when they wished to travel between Saudi Arabia and 
Afghanistan or if they required Afghan documents for processing visas and residency in third 
countries (especially Turkey). Those who did not enter Saudi Arabia on Pakistani passports tended to 
hold specially designated hajj visas; they then overstayed these, often for several years, until they 
were deported to Afghanistan or found a ‘route’ to gaining access to Saudi residency documents. 
Normally, some family members have entered the country on a working visa while others are over-
stayers on a hajj visa.  
Most of the traders say that they were initially involved in small scale commercial activities in Jeddah 
and other cities, buying, for example, inexpensive goods from commodity wholesalers and then 
selling them at street stalls in the holy cities of Mecca or Medina. Successful traders rented shops in 
Mecca and Madinah to cover the period of the hajj pilgrimage season when profit margins are at 
their highest. The Central Asian émigré traders from Afghanistan also successfully entered the 
restaurant market in Saudi Arabia, opening cafes and eateries selling a version of Turkmen palaw 
referred to in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Countries more generally as Bukhary rice. They also filled 
other niches, such as the gathering, packaging and transportation of dates. 
As with the Afghan Turkmen traders who mediated Turkmenistan’s relationship with the UAE and 
then China, traders from northern Afghanistan in Saudi Arabia increasingly positioned themselves as 
middleman agents between Saudi Arabia and other Asian regions. On the one hand, this wave of 
migrants to Saudi Arabia publicly emphasised the Bukharan aspects of their identities, branding the 
                                                          
9 Rogers 2014 discusses ‘petrobarter’ and the insights this offers into understanding ‘universalising 
imaginaries’ of monetized exchange. 
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goods they brought from China with names such as ‘Bukhara’ and ‘Turkistan’. In so doing, the 
traders aligned themselves with historic migrants from Central Asia to Saudi Arabia who now mostly 
hold Saudi citizenship. On the other hand, the traders actively built on their existing relationships 
and commercial activities. From the mid-1980s onwards, increasing numbers of Muslims from 
Central Asian and the Caucasus began to travel to Saudi Arabia for hajj. During the hajj season, 
Central Asian émigré s from northern Afghanistan who were based in Jeddah, as well as Mecca and 
Madinah, sourced valuable antiques (e.g. embroidered cloth, carpet fragments, and jewellery) from 
the visiting pilgrims. These items were then sold in shops they owned in the Kingdom, and that were 
popular amongst wealthy Saudi families, as well as the country’s international expatriate 
community.  Émigré Central Asians, moreover, are also active in the global antique market, owning 
retail and wholesale businesses in Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar, for instance: valuable items sources in 
Saudi Arabia were also moved internationally. 
A second source of such international relationships was the presence of a commercially active 
community of families from northern Afghanistan in Turkey. The Turkish government resettled 
thousands of Turkic-speaking Afghans (mostly from Pakistan’s refugee camps) in the mid-1980s.10 
These refugees were settled across the country, but especially in the South-east (e.g. in Hatay, 
Gazaiantep, Shahliurfa), east (Van), and north (Tokat) and in Istanbul (Zeytinburnu).  Ethno-linguistic 
identity was an important criterion used by the Turkish authorities to identify families considerable 
suitable for relocation in Turkey. Against this backdrop, most communities of Afghans in Turkey 
identify themselves as Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh or Kirghiz, have established community associations 
(anjoman, karnak, dernigi) in relationship to such categories, and have also sought to form broader 
collective identities around the notion of ‘Afghan Turk’. Today, men who migrated to Turkey as 
teenage boys during openly reflect on the shift’s in their personal and collective identities, as well as 
the language preferences of their families underwent during this period. One man, now in his early 
forties, told me that while he identified himself as being an Uzbek his family had spoken Farsi with 
one another in their home region of Takhar in northern Afghanistan: it was only having migrated to 
Turkey that his Uzbek language improved (Uzbek qawi shud).       
These communities initially found employment in Turkish owned stitching and clothing sweatshops 
and factories, but eventually used skills they had acquired in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s refugee 
camps – the making of suede clothing and carpets in particular – to produce goods for international 
export. The clothes they produced supplied the markets of the former Soviet Union, while prayer 
mats were predominantly produced for sale in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Bukharan émigré 
traders who were based in Saudi Arabia having initially made their money in trading goods 
purchased within the Kingdom from the 1990s increasingly sourced commodities in Turkey. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s, a handful of Saudi-based traders opened factories and sweatshops in 
Turkey. Traders based in Saudi Arabia have additionally told me that until the onset of the war in 
Syria, they would also travel from Jeddah to Aleppo to purchase machine-made carpets. One 
Jeddah-based trader that I met in Istanbul in July 2016 told me that he now travels to Jordan to buy 
carpets from a merchant he knew in Aleppo who moved his carpet-weaving machines out of Syria. 
Afghan émigré Turkmens working in Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar have also forged business partnerships 
with Syrian jewellers who have relocated to Istanbul: Turkmen traders provide semi-precious stones, 
and direct market in their shops for the jewellery produced by their Syrian partners.  
                                                          
10Afghan itinerants (mostly pilgrims and merchants) claimed multiple forms of imperial jurisdictional 
subjecthood, including of the Ottomans, the Russian Empire, and British India. See Ahmed 2016; Can 2012, 
2016; Stephens 2016.   
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Finally, in the early 2000s several traders closed their factories in Turkey in the context of rising costs 
and competition from Chinese machine-made carpets (including joy namaz or prayer mats). By the 
time of my fieldwork in Yiwu in 2016, not only were traders exporting to Jeddah deemed to be 
amongst the most successful Afghan merchants in the city, several Jeddah-based trading families 
had established themselves in Yiwu, running transport companies, commissioning agent services, as 
well as owning restaurants. In addition to carpets and prayer mats, the traders also export t-shirts 
and Arab-style clothing from China to Saudi Arabia. In 2017 in Istanbul, I also met a Jeddah-based 
trader who exported children’s toys from China to Saudi Arabia yet who was in the process of 
opening an office and shop in Istanbul’s Istoc wholesale market.  
Hajji Abdullah, for example, is a trader in his late forties who is the son of a Central Asian émigré 
family that were based in the northern town of Aqchah from the 1920s until 1983, when they moved 
to Pakistan, before eventually shifting to Jeddah in the late 1980s. Over the course of 2016 I met Haji 
Abdullah in Yiwu (during the course of a purchasing trip he made in mid-June), Zeytinburnu (during a 
visit he made to the city connected to his attending a relative’s wedding party in July), and Jeddah 
(the city in which he is ‘permanently’ based and was awaiting a shipment of goods to arrive from 
China in December). Hajji Abdullah owned a yarn factory in Turkey for some years in the 2000s but 
this closed (at a considerable financial loss) and he turned his attention instead to importing goods 
to Saudi Arabia from China. The Hajji recognises that there are benefits to purchasing goods in 
China: 'hajjis buy lots of gifts for their relatives and they don't care about the quality only the price'. 
Importantly, then the specific nature of the business activities of traders in the Arabian Peninsula, 
and the clientele whom they serve, means that they do not face the same difficulties that are faced 
by merchants working in other settings, and caused by the supply of sub-standard commodities. 
Indeed, Hajji Abdullah, exports to Jeddah Arab-style tunics (thobe) that are made in Yiwu by a 
company that employs men interned in Chinese jails as tailors. Like other traders, he also exports 
higher quality Turkish products to Saudi Arabia, especially clothing and carpets, from Turkey, and, 
increasingly from China. Traders based in Jeddah involved in these activities talk openly about the 
other merchant groups with whom they compete and the factors that have enabled them to achieve 
the success they have. In December 2016, for example, I was told by several traders that their 
fiercest competitors were traders from Yemen, who also travel to Yiwu to purchase small 
commodities. It was also remarked to me that an opening had been created for Afghan traders in 
Jeddah because of a downturn of relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen during the first Gulf 
War (Yemen opposed the US-led intervention), and it was this rift that opened a niche for 
Afghan/Central Asian émigré merchants.  
Importantly, the shift to Chinese production has not led traders to remove their capital from Turkey 
– those with citizenship or residency instead have become increasingly active in the real estate 
trade, sourcing property most especially for wealthy and middle-class Afghans who buy houses in 
Istanbul with the aim of securing residency permits for their families. This path to Turkish residency 
and even citizenship is deployed by many Afghans who made money in Afghanistan during the 2000s 
and fear for the security of the country and the families, especially after the 2014 withdrawal of 
NATO forces.  
Perpetual Nomads? 
The history of this mobile society made-up of long-term Central Asian émigré s who trade across 
West, Central and East Asia, and have established centres of community life in two of the historic 
‘choke points’ of the Ottoman Empire (Jeddah and Istanbul), positions itself in complex ways to 
Afghanistan. Unlike in the traders who travelled backwards and forwards between Afghanistan and 
Turkmenistan, a substantial majority of the Saudi-based men I have spoken to say they have never 
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returned to Afghanistan after having left in the early 80s. They explain this by saying it is because 
they were already refugees in Afghanistan when they left the country for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 
There is also the general perception that officials in the Afghan state were ambiguous in the ways in 
which they treated the Central Asian emigres: if many elders appreciate the land afforded them by 
Afghan officials,  others claim emigres faced difficulties in the country because of delays they faced 
in receiving Afghan national identity documents (tazkira) (e.g. Nasiri and Khalili 2012: 231). As a 
result, I am told, while they felt attachment to northern Afghanistan as a homeland (watan) that 
arose from its status as their place of birth (joy-e tawallud), then their political commitments to the 
state were more contested. 
Life in Saudi Arabia has also provided the opportunity for these traders and the communities to 
which they belong to explore their own histories of transregional connectedness. Saudi Arabia, 
operates the kafil system (a Saudi citizen is required to be a partner of the business activities of a 
resident foreigner): some of my informants have told me that their kafil are third generation 
descendants of 1920 émigré s from the Emirate of Bukhara.11 These people, they say, have ‘become 
Arab’ but are still more trustworthy partners than Saudi citizens without a shared Central Asian 
heritage. One trader, a Farsi-speaker originally from the Samangan province in northern Afghanistan, 
told me that he owns a house in Istanbul, and that in the summer of 2016 he had allowed his 
originally Kashgari kafil to use for two weeks. Four weeks later, when we met, the trader and his 
family was staying in a hotel because the kafil had decided to prolong his stay in Turkey. Following 
Engseng Ho, it is helpful to think of these dispersed traders as forming a ‘partial grouping’ (Ho 2013, 
2014, forthcoming). Ho uses the concept of ‘partial grouping’ to refer to a group which is 
geographically dispersed, connected to counterpart communities across long distances, and formed 
in relationship to ongoing circulations and exchanges over time. The case of Afghanistan’s Turkmen 
traders in Jeddah and Turkey brings attention to the ways in which the scattering of these traders 
has also facilitated circulations of people, ideas, and things over extended periods of time.  
The more successful traders have increasingly fashioned the Zeytinburnu neighbourhood of Istanbul 
as a node for their commercial and affective lives. They come to Istanbul in the summer to escape 
the heat of Jeddah, as well as to order carpets and clothes that are made in Turkey to be delivered to 
Saudi Arabia on time for the great hajj pilgrimage. Many also attend or organise the weddings of 
relatives who were resettled in Turkey in the 1980s, preferring to organise such events in Turkey as 
opposed to either Jeddah or their home towns in Afghanistan. Indeed, several of the Afghan traders 
I have talked with successfully sought to acquire Turkish citizenship in the 1990s and 2000s  often 
purchasing property in Turkey to assist their cases.12 Holding a Turkish passport they say, raises their 
status in Saudi Arabia: if they are to fall foul of the law they are likely to receive better treatment if 
they are Turkish citizens than if living in Saudi Arabia solely on a residency permit connected to a 
Pakistani or Afghan document.  
For some traders, Turkish citizenship confers a national identity that better reflects their collective 
histories than that of ‘Afghan’. Perhaps more importantly, though, possessing Turkish citizenship 
                                                          
11  See (Balci 2007) on Saudi Arabia’s Central Asian émigré community.  
12 Statistics suggest that Afghans fall within the top four list of countries in terms of acquisition of property in 
Istanbul after Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Russia (Ashar Al-Awsat 28th August, 2016).  Afghan Central Asian 
émigré traders in Jeddah are aware of the extent to which their community’s capital is tied up in Istanbul. After 
being informed of a bomb blast that killed several people in Istanbul, a trader in a shop I was visiting in Jeddah 
left to go home and follow events on the TV. A further trader said to me, ‘don’t worry about him, he’s just 
bought a property in Istanbul and is worried if its value will fall. If there is a bomb attack in his country of birth 
– Afghanistan – he doesn’t so much as batter an eyelid’.  
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affords the children of these trading families access to higher education in Turkey, something such 
families face severe barriers to in Saudi Arabia: ‘when our children finish class 12’, it is often 
remarked to me, ‘we have no choice but to bring them into the shop or warehouse and start them 
trading’. For many others, indeed, the role played by Turkey in their personal and collective political 
affiliations and identities is a sensitive topic that is best approached in the pragmatic manner that 
has characterised their earlier migratory experiences. There is plenty of discussion in and amongst 
these families about the extent to which being Turkish genuinely assures them of an ‘authentic’ 
identity. In one house in which I stayed in Mazar-i Sharif in 2016 and again in 2017 for example I saw 
a lively debate between a Turkmen Afghan who had moved his family to Istanbul in 2011 and a 
Turkmen trader who lived in Afghanistan with his family though frequently travelled to the Central 
Asian countries for commercial purposes. The Afghanistan-based trader was opposed to Turkmen 
families leaving Afghanistan on the grounds that they were buying into an exclusive form of Turkish 
national identity. He argued, instead, that Afghanistan’s Turkmen’s should be committed to 
protecting their people’s role and history in lands that had been of importance to Turkmen identity 
for centuries. During an evening of hospitality at the household of a Turkmen merchant in Riyadh, I 
witnessed a similar debate between elders in the community who argued that their people naturally 
belonged to Turkey and others who were suspicious of Turkish policy towards Central Asia’s Turkic-
language speakers. A cause of this suspicion lies in a sense that while Turkish officials might speak of 
Central Asians as their ‘brothers’ they continue to treat such groups as sources of cheap labour or 
hard capital.  
The networks that facilitate the flows of commodities from China to Saudi Arabia, as well as 
between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, are informed by several generations of mobility that is connected 
to both trade and political displacement. These traders have thus played an active role in seeking to 
establish and sustain sites of familial and affective life that are less visible in the other ‘Afghan’ 
trading networks emanating from Yiwu, such as Dari-speaking traders from north eastern 
Afghanistan involved in the sale of counterfeit up-market mountain clothing brands, as well as 
gemstones, or the ethnically mixed former socialist officials pivotal to the trade in small commodities 
between China and the former Soviet Union (Marsden 2017). For many of the traders who are active 
across Saudi Arabia, China and Turkey questions of identity and belonging, as well as strategic moves 
concerning how to find permanent homes for their families, co-habit with pragmatic commercial 
considerations and are addressed on a day-to-day level.  Ho’s concept of ‘mobile society’ is helpful in 
the analysis of this particular group of traders because of the sustained forms of mobility that 
characterise their social dynamics across a range of historical periods. 
Conclusion  
Anthropologists and scholars in related disciplines have for long been aware of the role that Afghans 
play in the Gulf’s labour market (e.g. Nichols 2008). There has been less recognition however of the 
role that the country’s people have played in the commercial dynamics of the region. Nor have 
scholars sufficiently recognised the critical role that traders from Afghanistan are playing in 
connecting the markets of the Gulf to other Asian settings, ranging from Istanbul in Turkey, to 
Ashghabat in Turkmenistan, and Yiwu in China. Future work in the field of Inter-Asian connections 
might seek similarly therefore to not merely identify and describe transregional axes of interaction 
(e.g. the Indian Ocean, West East-Central-West Asian connections) but also theorise the dynamics 
whereby these coalesce, such as in Istanbul and Jeddah. If, indeed, much of the literature on the 
nature of inter-Asian has focused on the ways in which oceans do or do not foster universalisms and 
religion as the cultural-moral ground of exchange and interaction, my consideration in this article of 
the ways in which Afghan overland routes interact both with pan-Turkic ideals and provisioning the 
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hajj with religious commodities suggest the possibility for more studies of the role played by 
territorial trading groups in the emergence of expansive identities (see Anderson this volume). 
By focusing on specific, multiple, mobile ‘partial communities’ that are distributed across Asia yet 
interconnected with one another across both space and time, I have also suggested the form of an 
account of thick trans-regionalism. Analytically, the concept of partial societies is helpful for such an 
endeavour because it disaggregates the phenomenon under investigation into a series of 
movements, adjustments and sites of interaction. Building on a parallel body of literature that brings 
attention to the pragmatic concerns of border-crossing intellectuals in early twentieth century West 
Asia, I have also sought to describe shifts in the identity formations of this mobile society and assess 
how these relate to transforming geopolitical initiatives and circumstances. Rather than having to 
assume a single site or moment of dispersion as necessitated by the concept of diaspora, the notion 
of partial community enables an exploration of how mobile actors identify their backgrounds, 
identities and collective histories in changing ways according to the varying circumstances in which 
they find themselves. As a trader in his late thirties who identified himself as Turkmen born in 
Afghanistan to the children of émigré s from Central Asia, raised in Saudi Arabia, and a frequent 
visitor to Turkey, remarked to me after dropping me at Riyadh International Airport, ‘let’s see what 
happens next, we are basically a nomadic people, and while my elders are now putting their faith in 
Erdogan and describing themselves as the original Turks, when things inevitably change in Turkey, 
especially in the field of business, I’m sure we’ll start moving elsewhere, just God knows where!’. 
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